IMS convenes media and experts in Copenhagen to develop joint responses to FIMI

Participants used the Charette to share knowledge of successful models that are currently being used to counter disinformation operations. Experts have co-created four results that can be applied in different countries, including a framework for identifying FIMI patterns and a practical prebunking model based on early signs of information disinformation. The experts’ outcomes will serve as a solid foundation for the development of dedicated guidelines and comprehensive recommendations in the future.

Understanding contemporary information operations

The Copenhagen Charette built on the outcomes of the Copenhagen Conference on Information Integrity, hosted by IMS in autumn 2025 at UN City. The charette continued the collaborative spirit of the conference, bringing together independent media, investigative journalists, representatives of public institutions and information security experts from Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, the Western Balkans, Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. The intensive two‑day collaborative process was a unique opportunity for the expert participants to develop shared analyses and create solutions-oriented strategies.

According to Gulnara Akhundova, Regional Director for Europe at IMS, countering FIMI is only possible through joint action and the exchange of expertise between media, public institutions, researchers and civil society.

Said Kicki Westin, Specialist, Democracy and Governance Unit Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Department, Folke Bernadotte Academy: “FIMI is not just about content or distribution channels. It is about hostile actors’ strategic efforts to shape the environment in which reality is interpreted.”

She emphasised that FIMI operations seek to undermine the rule of law, civil liberties and democratic decision-making processes. Understanding such operations therefore requires analysing not only narratives, but also intent and systemic effects – including how influence targets information and financial flows, public expectations, legitimacy and trust.

The United Kingdom’s approach: focusing on vulnerabilities

Jamie Sutherland, representing the Government Communications Service International (UK), presented the UK government’s approach to countering hybrid threats and FIMI. Rather than responding to every individual narrative, the approach focuses on strengthening underlying vulnerabilities within national systems and capabilities.

“Instead of trying to counter everything related to FIMI, we should strengthen what already works against it,” Sutherland noted.

This approach prioritises proactive risk identification and capability-building in areas where societies are most vulnerable: “skating to where the puck is going, not where it has been.”

Sutherland illustrated how information operations conducted by authoritarian actors aim to divide societies and discredit institutions, and how strengthening social cohesion, institutional trust and credible alternatives can serve as an effective response.

The Swedish perspective: threats are strongest where vulnerabilities exist

Mikael Tofvesson of theCparta Cyber Defensepresented Sweden’s approach to countering FIMI, which focus on identifying vulnerabilities – ranging from core democratic values to critical societal functions – and proactively building resilience to reduce long-term risks. Trust between citizens and public institutions plays a central role in this approach.

“Disinformation, deception and propaganda work because they exploit specific sets of vulnerabilities within society,” Tofvesson explained.

The Ukrainian context: a whole-of-society approach

Anayit Khoperiya, FIMI Adviser for Ukraine at IMS, shared recent case studies from the Ukrainian context, stressing that Ukraine’s experience cannot be directly compared to that of other countries.

“In Ukraine, FIMI almost always intensifies during crises, whether energy-related, security or economic. Manipulative campaigns often combine disinformation with people’s real fears,” Khoperiya noted.

“This is why early narrative detection, support for independent media and coordination between newsrooms and institutions are essential.”

She emphasised that FIMI should not be understood as isolated information attacks, but as long-term systemic operations shaping trust, expectations and societal behaviour. Effective responses therefore require a whole-of-society approach, involving cooperation between media, public institutions, civil society and technology platforms.

In Ukraine, the combination of investigative journalism, strategic communications and audience-focused vulnerability analysis has already demonstrated tangible results.

Among the key challenges identified were systematic campaigns aimed at discrediting government institutions through corruption narratives, attempts to undermine public trust and the exploitation of crisis-related topics – including energy, infrastructure and the economy – to amplify fear and uncertainty.

Media vulnerability and resilience to FIMI

The programme also examined how disinformation is actively deployed across Europe during election periods.

Victor Ilie, investigative journalist at Snoop.ro (Romania), presented findings from investigations into electoral interference in Romania, highlighting the use of native advertising, social media manipulation and large-scale data exploitation. He underscored transparency, media literacy and cross-newsroom collaboration as key pillars of resilience.

Similar challenges were identified across the Western Balkans, where disinformation is systematically used to influence electoral processes, increase polarisation and undermine trust in democratic institutions. Participants from the region pointed to the role of politically affiliated media, opaque content financing and coordinated social media campaigns.

Local newsrooms remain particularly vulnerable due to limited resources and political or economic pressure. At the same time, experiences from the Balkans demonstrate that cross-border collaboration, joint investigations and adherence to independent journalistic standards can significantly strengthen media resilience to FIMI. Media literacy and long-term institutional investment in independent media remain critical components of effective responses.

Moldovan expertise: a focus on local information ecosystems

Moldova’s experience also featured prominently in the discussions, reflecting the intersection of internal political dynamics, external influence and information pressure ahead of elections.

Participants from Moldova highlighted that FIMI often manifests through local information ecosystems – regional media, social networks and messaging platforms – where manipulative narratives rapidly adapt to local contexts. Strengthening the capacities of independent newsrooms, fostering partnerships between journalists and analysts and investing in systematic media literacy efforts were identified as key responses.

Continuing IMS’ systemic work on information integrity

The Copenhagen Charette marked a continuation of IMS’ work following the 2025 Copenhagen Conference on Information Integrity at UN City. Since that conference, IMS has published a series of analytical materials and practical tools aimed at transforming local initiatives into scalable approaches for the media development sector.

“This is never just a workshop or a conference. It is always about real implementation, continuous learning and the exchange of experience,” said Gulnara Akhundova, Regional Director for Europe at IMS. The event was supported by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sida and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. IMS also expresses gratitude to current and past donors who have supported IMS, partners with their generous contributions, Swedish MFA, FCDO and Norad.