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Executive Summary

The campaign period (13 February – 9 April 2010) and the election period (11 – 15 April) of the first multi-party elections in Sudan for 24 years were extensively covered by the mass media in Sudan. The coverage of electoral candidates and parties increased substantially as the campaign period neared its end. This was partly due to developments related to the elections: the withdrawal of a number of presidential candidates and the boycott or threats to boycott the elections by various parties. Voter education programs and articles also increased as the elections approached. During the 10 April 'silence day', when political candidates were supposed to stop their campaigns, the mass media continued to publish and broadcast their campaigns and campaign related news from the political parties. It was only after the elections that the mass media drastically decreased their post elections news (16 April – 6 June). In general the attention for postponed elections news which were taking place on the 5-6 of June 2010 was moderate. In the South, the media hardly paid any attention to postponed elections.

The elections were the major and sometimes only news item in the media during the campaign and elections. The extensive coverage of the elections and the electoral campaign by the media consisted mainly of (free) advertisements¹ by political actors, news and opinion pieces and analyses. The race for the National Presidency, the National Assembly and the GOSS Presidency dominated the news and coverage was concentrated on the two main parties, the NCP (National Congress Party) and SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement). The NCP led the race for media attention during the first period of the campaign, while the SPLM received more attention in the media in the final weeks of the campaign period. This trend is linked to the election events and news items which were covered over the last few weeks of the campaign.

The tone of the election coverage was in general neutral or positive, which shows that political actors campaigned for their own candidates, programmes and parties and that the media channelled information in a neutral way or acted as an accelerator in channelling positive news. This was mainly the case with the coverage of the two main political parties. This trend changed during the final month of the campaign when the tone sometimes became harsh or even aggressive. The number of hate speech cases increased significantly during the last month of campaigning. Both the media (journalists) and political actors were targets of and sources behind this development. The media was inclined to mix news pieces with the opinions of journalists, especially in the newspapers. After the elections the tone of the post elections news became more neutral again. Directly after the elections the Southern media focused on referendum related news (scheduled to take place in January 2011) rather than post elections news. In their coverage of referendum related topics, they focused on communicating the strong pro or contra unity messages of political actors.

This final report shows the findings of the media monitoring which took place in Sudan from 13 February– 6 June 2010. The media monitoring continues to assess how the media in Sudan covers post(poned) election news.

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¹ (Free) advertisements include time and space bought by political actors and parties which does not fall under the direct editorial responsibility.



The Media and Elections Project, funded by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is implemented by the Sudan Media and Elections Consortium, a group of national and international organisations with expertise in media support. These are Sudan Development Initiative (SUDIA), International Media Support (IMS), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Osservatorio di Pavia, Arab Working Group for media monitoring and Fojo media institute.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This report provides the results of the quantitative and qualitative media monitoring. Quantitative data proved to be a reliable and systematic way of research. The qualitative monitoring is a tool to be able to make a more thorough assessment of media behavior. Also, one needs to look at the overall media context of where the media monitoring activities took place in order to be able to analyze why the media behaves as it does.

The main conclusions of four months of monitoring the media in Sudan are:

No fair access to the media for political parties and candidates

- The media monitoring shows that many media outlets concentrate on two political parties in their coverage (NCP and SPLM). The smaller political parties did not have equal access to the media during the campaign period.

Coverage of the political parties and candidates by the media in a biased manner

- The media in Sudan was interested in covering the elections (to be more explicit, the campaigning period up to the national elections). However, the focus of the media was on the main political parties, where some of the media often reported in a positive way about these political parties. The dividing line between free advertisements for political actors/parties and editorial news coverage, was very thin. The media was inclined to copy and paste certain statements of political actors without any comment, confirmation, feedback, check with other sources or analysis. This contributed to the fact that the political parties and candidates have not been covered in an unbiased manner.

The possibility for the public to gather sufficient information through the media in order to make an informed decision on election day

- The public was able to gather significant information through the media about the elections, considering the extensive media coverage (radio, TV and print press) of the elections in Sudan. The total volume that a medium devoted to election news was mostly less than 10 percent during the campaigning period. That does not seem to be high, but looking at the total output of the media and the fact that the mass media in Sudan is a crucial channel to provide information to the Sudanese people, this outcome should not be underestimated. Although most media did not have innovative tools to cover the elections, there were also exceptions. South Sudan Radio (SSR) for instance and some private radio stations in the South did live-reporting from the field during voting days for the first time in their existence.
- Despite the coverage and some innovative ways of reporting on the elections, the political parties and candidates have not been covered in an unbiased manner. The media, and in particular the state media, contributed to the positive exposure of the main political parties and those in power. To be well-informed, the public had to have access to various and a diverse media output.



- Looking at certain examples or events which stood out in the media, it is likely that the media did have a certain level of impact on the behavior of the voter. For instance, when Yasser Arman stepped back as presidential candidate, the media reported this in a negative way. The media reported extensively on this event and given the way they reported it, it is likely that this will have impacted on the negative reaction of the public and the decreased popularity of Arman. Another example is the way the media covered the case of Athor George in Jonglei. The media reported extensively on how the governor-candidate turned (back) into a rebel after he lost the election, with his forces fighting the authorities and leading to casualties. The media attention to this development shows how Jonglei turns into a trouble zone which can affect the image and peace building in the state. A false and unconfirmed report about the early defeat of a governor-candidate in Central Equatoria in a Southern newspaper, led to a 'visit' by supporters to the newsroom demanding that the article be rectified (which took place).

The ability of the public to gather sufficient information through the media to assist the public in making an informed decision and opinion for postponed elections

- The media in Sudan were fragmented in covering the postponed elections; media in the North did cover the postponed elections, the media in the South did not show interest. It remains unclear whether this was because lack of knowledge (capacity) or lack of interest.
- Media in the South shifted the news agenda almost immediately after the national elections to focus on the referendum. As outlets are underdeveloped (in term of journalistic standards) and many are politicized and/or nationalistic, there is a significant risk that these media outlets will act as propaganda channels rather than neutral information providers.

The media and hate speech; the media as agent of pacification?

- During the campaign and elections the media in general did not publish or broadcast a lot of 'hate speech'. For the main part, it was the print press that mainly used defamation, in which the journalists themselves and the politicians were sources of hate speech. Most cases appeared in the final weeks of the campaigning period. The media were remarkably quiet about riots and tribal conflict in some of the states. This showed a lack of reliable information sources, capacity, or a certain agenda, in which the media concerned did not want to 'disturb' the election process and the peace building (CPA). This could be an example of the media being agents of pacification. However, if the media would want to contribute to the peace process and democratization, they would rather follow a news agenda with regular attention for themes like (human) rights, democratic processes and justice. In some cases, the media were not a typical agent of pacification, considering certain propaganda language that was used (calls from certain political parties), but also the lack of information on democracy and human rights in the media. In general the media did not promote violence.

Recommendations for media (monitoring) and elections are:

The recommendations are based on the experience and output of monitoring the media during the elections in Sudan. However, these recommendations can also be used in the context of other media



monitoring exercises in Sudan such as the Referendum which is scheduled to take place in January 2011.

Legal framework

- A regulatory system should be put in place in the case of elections either as self-regulation or statutory regulation ensuring that equal opportunities are granted to all candidates and political alternatives in a wide range of media programmes. The right of all candidates and political parties participating in the election to use public media on the basis of equality and equal opportunities and to prevent any kind of discrimination were guaranteed in the National Elections Act. Although stipulated in the act, a control mechanism lacked to ensure these rights. In the case of the Referendum, for any provisions that by act are put in place for access to the mass media, a control mechanism should be in place and functioning.
- Provisions against hidden or unlabelled advertising should be in place. The paid advertising should be clearly identified and regulated. Financial transparency for both the financing of political parties and their campaigns must be ensured to allow for fairness between competitors. In the case of the Referendum the media should be aware of their role as neutral information providers and watchdog of the society.
- A system of access to (free) airtime should be in place so as to ensure that minor parties have access to this opportunity.
- Provisions against hate speech should be in place; e.g.by an Act (including the definition of hate speech) and regulatory system within the media.

Media development

- The production of targeted programmes debates, talk shows, etc. should be encouraged and supported as these programs have proven to provide relevant information during the elections. In general, unlike the news (which is few minutes of airtime), programmes specifically devoted to elections (debates, talk shows, etc) the political parties are able to better articulate their political platforms for the benefit of voters/viewers/listeners. For the upcoming referendum it is crucial to include a wider range of formats to inform the public and audiences.
- The government should encourage the media sector to develop initiatives for private/ community based television and radio to provide a range of independent programs; licenses should also be granted with greater transparency.
- Self-regulatory guidelines for journalists and the editors should be promoted to ensure compliance with professional journalistic standards, codified in a charter of conduct that would be respected by all parties. A charter of conduct as developed in Southern Sudan should be accepted and incorporated in the editorial statute of the newsroom.
- Continuation and intensification of training of journalists and media houses regarding professionalism, impartiality, neutrality and awareness of international standards related to the role of the media in general and during elections/referendum in particular.
- Media monitoring proved to be a reliable and qualitative way of researching the media output and behaviour in Sudan in a systematic way. Media monitoring should be supported during crucial democratic processes, such as elections, referendum, etc as it is a functional tool for many stakeholders, not in the last place for the development of the media sector itself.



I. Media Monitoring: structure and methodology

The Sudan Media and Elections Consortium (SMEC) was established to implement a Media and Election project in Sudan. One of the main activities of the SMEC was media monitoring of election coverage. The media monitoring took place all over Sudan, with two main joint media monitoring units, one in Khartoum and one in Juba, employing a total of 36 Sudanese media monitors. Seven media monitoring units at state level were established in North Kordufan, North Darfur, Red Sea, Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile and Central Equatoria. All units were run by national management and monitors with the support of international experts. Within the Sudanese Media and Elections Consortium, the Osservatorio di Pavia and the Arab Working Group (AWG) were responsible for advising on the implementation of media monitoring operations and methodology.

Units began the media monitoring of election coverage on 13 February 2010 at the opening of the campaign. Observation continued until 6 June 2010 to assess post election coverage and the postponed elections in a few constituencies

The SMEC carried out media monitoring of four TV stations, seventeen radio channels and thirteen newspapers on a daily basis². The media included in the sample were selected according to a number of criteria, including territorial reach, estimated audience and circulation.

All selected media were monitored according to a methodological approach created in 1995 and based on content analysis. The system was tested and adopted in a number of elections by international organisations and civic society groups all over the world, including Algeria, Morocco, Bahrain Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, Tunisia, Yemen, Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, Congo, Togo, Sierra Leone and Madagascar.

The methodology included two main components: the monitoring of election and political coverage and the monitoring of hate speech.

The monitoring of election and political coverage was based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis and it aimed at observing and assessing the extent to which media provided fair and balanced coverage of politicians and other stakeholders within the electoral process, according to national laws, domestic regulations and professional codes of conduct as well as international best practices.

Quantitative analysis measured the time and space allocated to different parties or candidates. Each mention of the subject was logged separately and the amount of time and space allocated was then recorded on a coding form. Each mention was also classified in terms of tone towards the political actor covered according to a three-value scale of positive, neutral and negative.

TV: Sudan TV, Blue Nile, Khartoum State TV and South Sudan TV

Radio stations; Omdurman Radio, Khartoum State Radio , Peace Service, Al Qwat Al Mussalaha, Saheroon, North Kurdufan, North Darfur, Red Sea, South Sudan Radio, Radio Miraya, Radio Bakhita, Liberty FM, Junubna FM, Rumbek FM, 97.5 FM/Voice of Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan Radio Malakal, Spirit FM



² Press: Al Sahfa, Al Ray Al Aam, Al Intibaha, Al Sudani, Akhir Lahza, Ajras Al huriah, Akhbar Alyoum, Al Ayam, The Citizen, Juba Post, Khartoum Monitor, Southern Eye and Sudan Vision

The qualitative analysis was based on the systematic observation of specific themes and issues: voter education, women and gender balance, coverage of election authorities and the election process and the context and standards of media work in Sudan.

The second component, monitoring hate speech or inflammatory language - either reported or originated by the media itself – aimed at assessing whether the media acted as agents of pacification or rather contributed to increase any potential tensions related to elections. This exercise observed whether the media published or broadcast hate speech through and by any political speakers, whether the media itself promoted violence, which were the main sources of hate speech and who were the target groups affected.

II. Legal framework for election coverage

Sudan is a State Party of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by more than 160 States. The ICCPR imposes binding obligations on signatories and elaborates on several of the rights included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of expression. Article 25 of the ICCPR – based on Article 21 of UDHR - guarantees the right to political participation. Finally, Article 2 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination on the ground of political ideas, thus providing a legal basis for the right of political parties and candidates to have equal access to the public media.

Sudan has also signed the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Article 9 of this charter protects 'the right to receive information (and) the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.'

In addition to its international commitments under these human rights treaties and declarations, Sudan has agreed to respect and ensure freedom of expression and access to information under the provisions of a number of thematic human rights treaties that touch on issues of freedom of expression, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

At the national level, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) expressly provides that violations of human rights shall be considered as violations of the CPA itself.

The 2005 Interim National Constitution of Sudan provides for a Bill of Rights. Article 39 of the Constitution protects the right to freedom of expression and of the media under Article 28. The Interim Constitution also establishes a division of competence between the central Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan, and State Governments, which includes issues of media regulation.

The regulatory framework for election coverage is established in the National Election Act. The Act states that candidates and political parties "shall be afforded access to and use of all means of communication media", a provision that applies to all media.



Rules specifying the necessary measures to guarantee the rights of all candidates and political parties to access the public media on the basis of equality and equal opportunities were defined by the National Election Commission (NEC). The NEC in conjunction with the state media prepared an inclusive schedule to guarantee the equal use of the public media by all contestants. The NEC Joint Media Mechanism (JMM) was created to verse the provision of equal air time to presidential and gubernatorial candidates. The 72 parties registered for elections were also granted 30 minutes each. Candidates and parties were responsible for producing their own video and/or audio clips.

On 15 February 2010 the NEC issued an order establishing the schedule for the order of appearances of all candidates and parties. In addition, the Commission released a detailed list of rules and regulations that all political parties and independent candidates must adhere to in order to ensure equal campaigning opportunities for electoral nominees.

Also, Professional Media Guidelines for Election Coverage were published and NEC conducted sensitisation workshops with the media and other stakeholders both in Khartoum and Juba. According to the instructions issued by the NEC any candidate or party that made a claim of having been defamed or injured by a media house, print or electronic, would be granted either the opportunity to reply or be entitled to a correction or retraction by the media house who made the alleged defamatory statement. The reply or correction had to be made in approximately the same time period or space as the alleged defamatory statement. The guidelines also required journalists to operate in a way that upheld their highest professional ethical standards, in the exercise of their constitutional right of free expression and in recognition of their social accountability.

III. Media Environment and Freedom of the Media

Sudan has a modest number of media outlets for a country as big as Sudan, with the result that some media have great power, with the state controlled media a *de facto* monopoly on the information provision on government related news. Under the SMEC media monitoring project about 34 media were observed³. These 32 media outlets are the main media players in Sudan. Apart from these, there are some more regional state television and radio broadcasters (in the North under strict government control, in the South there is only state radio, no state television). Furthermore, there are some newspapers produced and printed in Khartoum targeting Northern audiences and some shortwave radio stations (Radio Darfur, Sudan Radio Services). During the campaign period, a few new media houses were established or re-established (such as the Democrat newspaper and Sudan Tribune newspaper). The mass media - both in the North and the South- are regarded as the main information providers to the people of Sudan. In particular, the radio is an important media as it is accessible for most people. The radio in the North is under strict state control, the radio sector in the South experiences more freedom. Apart from the mass media, the church and the mosque



³ Print press: Al Sahafa, Al Ray Al Aam, Al Intibaha, Al Sudani, Akhir Lahza, Ajras Al huriah, Akhbar Alyoum, Al Ayam, The Citizen, Juba Post, Khartoum Monitor, Southern Eye and Sudan Vision

TV: Sudan TV, Blue Nile, Khartoum State TV and South Sudan TV

Radio stations; Omdurman Radio, Khartoum State Radio, Peace Service, Al Qwat Al Mussalaha, Saheroon, North Kurdufan, North Darfur, Red Sea, South Sudan Radio, Radio Miraya, Radio Bakhita, Liberty FM, Junubna FM, Rumbek FM, 97.5 FM/Voice of Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan Radio Malakal, Spirit FM

have been main information providers to the people during the election period. Here, politicians gave speeches, and their campaigns went hand in hand with the prayers of a preacher/imam.

Radio is the type of media with the biggest reach in Sudan. Omdurman (State) Radio and State TV were amalgamated in 2002 to become Sudan Radio and Television Corporation (SRTC). Regional stations began to appear at the beginning of the 1980s. Nowadays there are regional radio stations in 18 of the 26 states and they relay Omdurman transmissions. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has inherited 3 medium wave radio stations from the Khartoum government, the GOSS radio stations broadcast in Juba, Malakal and Wau. Since 2006 new FM radio stations have been launched in Southern Sudan, particularly in the town of Juba. They operate under difficult conditions and have very little of their own production due to lack of equipment, knowledge, capacity and funds. There is an increase in local (community) radio stations in Equatoria states and other Southern states. The UN Radio FM Miraya has been operational in Juba since June 2006 and is well equipped, including internet facilities.

Television, because of its cost, is trailing behind radio. The government in Khartoum relays television programs from Omdurman to various parts of Sudan via South Sudan TV (SSTV). There is no other prominent South Sudanese TV broadcaster beyond SSTV. The print media sector in Northern Sudan is well developed; many titles are available in Khartoum and they are technically professional. However, despite channeling these pluralistic voices, the Arabic media operates in a political context which limits the freedom of expression. Newspapers available in the South (English) are still printed in Khartoum or abroad. The quality is moderate due to lack of capacity and training. There is a willingness and aim to play the role of communicator for the people of Southern Sudan, but due to lack of knowledge of the media law and cases in which journalists were arrested, the media is inclined to work within a restricted framework of press freedom.

Media in the North are *politicised* and often regarded as an extended arm of the ruling parties. Journalists are aware of this and are careful in their reporting. They are familiar with basic international journalistic standards, but cannot practice these in general. They have to be creative and diplomatic. After the elections took place, some journalists have been arrested, showing a stricter control on the media in the North. Media in the South experience more freedom, although there are also regular reports from media 'harassed' by security. During the campaign period some media houses were questioned by security about their 'political' reporting, but the ruling party in the South condemned this action. During the elections the media felt relatively free in its reporting.

Where the state media in the North are seen as a wing of NCP's agenda, South Sudan TV (SSTV), which is the state television in the South that is seen as representing the SPLM agenda. Some other independent media do not make use of their independent status and have chosen to represent the SPLM agenda as well (Liberty, Citizen, Southern Eye). This shows a political and economic interest/dependency, Southern nationalism or a lack of understanding of the role of media. South Sudan Radio (SSR) aims, despite being the state radio broadcaster in the South, to be a public radio broadcaster. It includes other political views and neutral awareness programs to educate the people. It is financed by the GOSS, but aims to develop a more public organizational structure.

The media sector in the South is young, and only started after the signing of the CPA in 2005. Due to this and the heritage of the media culture in the North, the Southern media are a mix of political media (supporting the ruling party in the South), yellow press (information provision based on



rumors or unconfirmed news) and business press (representing the interest or agenda of economic forces). The level of journalism in the South is low (quality of journalism), compared to other Sub Saharan African countries. Journalists do not yet practice journalistic standards, lack a basic knowledge of their country, politics, rights and legal structures. Finally, the media sector in the South is underdeveloped. The legal framework is unclear to the media practitioners, the Union of Journalists does not function properly yet (to defend the rights of journalists and act as an mediator for journalists), there is a lack of a self regulatory body to uphold certain standards, the media is not aware of its social role as watchdog for society and most media outlets have only a very basic infrastructure (lack of internet, computers etc).

Sudan lacks data on the reach of the media. The media itself often does not know who their audiences and public are, and where they are (this is a consequence of the fact that the media is regarded as a one-way/top down communication channel). No audience surveys are done in the country. Despite the lack of data, the mass media is believed to be the main information provider to the Sudanese people and in particular the radio stations.



IV. Media Monitoring: Findings and conclusions

During the campaign period, which opened on 13 February and ended on 9 April, TV, radios and newspapers widely and regularly covered the election process and candidates in a variety of formats and programmes. News was the main format through which radio and TV stations conveyed information regarding the elections and politics. Programmes outside the scope of the editorial control of the media – namely free and paid airtime – were also central to the media campaign of parties. Other genres, such as current affairs and talk shows, had a less relevant prominence in the schedule of the audiovisual media. The main formats used in the press were news articles, editorials and analysis. Paid advertising – both electorally and politically related – was another widespread form through which candidates and parties conveyed their messages. Information regarding election contestants was thus provided by the main media outlets, with the race for national presidential elections dominating media reports.

However, Sudanese media failed to provide a comprehensive and balanced coverage of alternative candidates and platforms. Most media only covered the two main political parties, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the South People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). In particular, the NCP and the SPLM enjoyed the highest coverage in the North and South media respectively. TV and radio stations in the North tended to give the NCP and its members the largest coverage; similarly the media targeting the South generally gave the SPLM the broadest visibility. In both geographical areas, other political forces received very limited attention compared to the two main ruling forces. The press reflected a similar trend with the ruling parties provided with the largest amount of print space.

In addition, both National and GoSS Governmental officials took advantage of their institutional role to gain additional visibility with staged events, such as the launch of development projects, receptions, inauguration events or inspection visits. A similar strategy was observed with regard to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation that was often used by the ruling parties' manifestos to win popularity.

The tone of the coverage was generally either neutral or positive while negative reporting was very sporadic. The NCP and the SPLM were the main targets for non-neutral reporting in all observed media. Usually, the media outlets which aligned with the NCP had a negative tone towards the SPLM. The outlets which aligned with the SPLM used a negative tone when covering the NCP.

Candidates and parties were granted equal free airtime on state media but a number of small parties did not manage to take advantage of this opportunity due to a lack of funds for the production of promotion clips.

Transparency regarding advertisement was not ensured as a number of paid articles and programmes were not labelled as such, thus possibly creating confusion among audiences. Furthermore, the line between the propaganda of politicians and editorial news coverage was sometimes very thin as the media was inclined to report certain statements without any comments, feedbacks or analysis.

During the post election phase, that covered the period from 15 April to 6 June 2010, a clear fragmentation in the news agenda was observed. The media in the North did cover the postponed elections taking place in a number of constituencies, while the media in the South neglected them



and shifted interest to the Referendum. The two main parties continued to be the main focus of journalistic attention and the tones of the coverage were mainly neutral or positive.

A number of episodes of inflammatory speech and offensive language were observed during the election period, mainly in the press. Over the 56 days of the campaign, the episodes of hate speech increased, mirroring the escalation of campaign tones and climate. The inflammatory language generally involved political parties and candidates that were both the main sources⁴ and the main targets⁵. Defamation was the main type of hate speech, with accusations and mutual blaming on behalf of the main contestants. However, other categories, such as 'call for violence' and 'accusations of rigging' increased during the campaign period. After elections, the tones of the political debate mitigated with a consequent reduction in hate speech cases.

1. Election and Political Coverage

1.1 Audiovisual Media

During the campaign period, South Sudan TV (SSTV), Blue Nile Television, Omdurman Radio, South Sudan Radio (SSR) and Sudan TV were the media outlets devoting the largest coverage to political parties and candidates.




Chart 1 Volume of the election and political coverage by channel during the campaign period

During the period observed, both television and radio channels ensured extensive coverage of politics and the elections. A number of different formats and programmes were available to the public with news bulletins and talk shows being the main channels to convey information about the

⁵ The source is the person or group originating the hate speech, as reported by the media.




⁴ The target is the individual or group against who hate speech is directed, as reported by the media.

campaign and political life.

The NCP and the SPLM were the two parties that dominated journalistic coverage and they obtained respectively 40% and 49% of the overall airtime on television. The allocation of the coverage was clearly determined by the geographical targets of the media. In fact, most channels based in the North devoted the highest amount of airtime (75% of the overall airtime) to the NCP. Conversely, stations based in the South allotted nearly all their coverage to the SPLM (some 95% of the overall airtime). This data showed thus a clear advantage for the two main parties, a clear concentration and polarisation of the coverage among the two main political forces, a concomitant limited attention for smaller parties and a distribution of time based on geographical target audiences of the channels.


Chart 2 Allocation of airtime among parties in news programmes during the campaign period by geographical area (all TV channels) – grey is Southern media, pink is Northern media



Radio coverage reproduced the same kind of trend with the NCP receiving a 41% of the overall news coverage and SPLM 43%. In line with what was observed for television, radio stations broadcasting from the North tended to devote the largest time to the NCP (75% of the overall time), while channels broadcasting from the South allotted the highest portion of their airtime to the SPLM (73%). In general all other parties received very limited coverage during the period monitored in both geographical areas. An exception to this general tendency was represented by Radio Miraya that – compared to other channels – managed to achieve a sounder balance between the main election contestants.

Chart 3 Allocation of airtime among parties in news programmes during the campaign period by geographical area (all radio channels) - grey is Southern media, pink is Northern media





The coverage did not present critical tones on behalf of the media. As a matter of fact, the style of reporting was generally either neutral or positive while negative reporting was very sporadic. The NCP and the SPLM usually enjoyed the highest positive visibility thus confirming the trend already observed in relation to their coverage.




Chart 4 Tone of the coverage in news programmes during the campaign period (all TV channels)

The lack of negative tones was also observed on radio channels; these covered the two main parties either positively or neutrally. The SPLM was the actor receiving the broadest favourable coverage.








Chart 5 Tone of the coverage in news programmes during the campaign period (all radio channels)

During the post election period, the NCP and the SPLM continued to enjoy the largest coverage both on radio and television. Again, a clear-cut difference was observed between Northern and Southern media, the former providing the NCP with the highest airtime (80%), the latter granting the SPLM with the widest exposure (82%).





After the elections, the journalistic tones continued reflecting a general lack of negative or critical coverage both on radio and television.






Chart 7 Tone of the coverage in news programmes during post election period (all channels)

1.2 Print Media

During the campaign period, Akhbar Alyoum, Akhir Lahza, Al Ray Al Aam, Al Sahfa, Al Intibaha and Al Sudani were the newspapers providing the largest coverage of political and election events and actors.






Chart 8 Volume of the election and political coverage by newspaper during the campaign period

In line with what was observed for audiovisual media, the NCP and the SPLM were the two parties dominating journalistic reporting even though the press ensured that a broader range of political



actors were covered and a less evident dominance of the two ruling parties. The NCP and the SPLM were allotted respectively 45% and 25% of the overall space. Again, the editorial lines of the media outlets were strictly related to their geographical targets. Newspapers based in the North devoted the highest amount of space (50%) to the NCP and publications based in the South devoted most of their coverage to the SPLM (some 43%).





The press did not have negative coverage; the newspapers were positive and the neutral tones were dominant.




Chart 10 Tone of the coverage in news programmes during the campaign period (all newspapers)



During the post election period, the trends observed during the campaign were confirmed with the NCP and the SPLM being the parties receiving the largest coverage (respectively 46% and 28%). Negative tones were present but only in a few cases (4%).

2. Hate Speech and Inflammatory Language

The number of explicit episodes of hate speech and inflammatory language during the election campaign period amounted to 260 cases. Most of the episodes were observed in the print media (232 cases), while audiovisual media showed a relatively lower incidence (18 cases on radio and 10 cases on television).




Chart 11 Distribution of cases of hate speech by media sector during the campaign period


Several of the cases observed were related to a very heated style of campaigning and confrontation between the main contestants rather than on targeted calls to violence and discrimination. The most common type of inflammatory language concerned episodes of defamation among candidates (193 cases), while more serious cases – such as call for violence or calls for conflict escalation – appeared very limited (36 cases).


However, during the course of the campaign the calls for violence and mutual accusations of rigging increased in number even though they involved topics regarding elections and they did not touch upon broader sectarian and ethnic issues and target groups.

The episodes of inflammatory language during the post election phase were limited compared to the previous period (86 cases in total) but the tenure of the speech seemed to have increased in harshness and tone. The main categories observed were related to accusations of rigging and calls for escalation of violence. Most of the cases were present in the media targeting Southern



audiences, with the print media presenting the highest number of episodes (52) while radio and television provided more limited time to this kind of speech (respectively 11 and 5 cases). Another relevant type of speech for the post election period was represented by the 'Other' category that included cases that cannot be properly classified as offensive speech but that still contains derogatory terms and accusations among candidates.





The analysis of the type of source⁶ for hate speech showed that politicians and parties (136 cases) or the media themselves (92 cases) were the main speakers. The majority of episodes regarding media as source of hate speech concerned print media (91 cases) rather than electronic outlets (only 1 case). Similarly, the main targets⁷ against whom inflammatory speeches were directed were politicians and election competitors (217 cases), while the presence of other categories appeared extremely limited.

The geographical scope of the speeches touched mainly upon the national level during the campaign period with the reciprocal exchange of accusations between the NCP and the SPLM. This means that most of the hate speech touched upon national issues, issues of concern to all of the Sudanese nation and not only a certain geographical area. The national scope of hate speech reduced in the aftermath of elections, while other areas – the South, Jonglei and Upper Nile – became more relevant.

⁷ The target is the individual or group against who hate speech is directed, as reported by the media.



⁶ The source is the person or group originating the hate speech, as reported by the media.




Chart 13 Geographical scope by period



Annex I – Charts for Audiovisual Media

I. The Campaign Period (13 February – 10 April)

Chart 1 Allocation of airtime by party on Al Qwat Al Mussalaha





Chart 2 Allocation of airtime by party on Blue Nile









Chart 3 Allocation of airtime by party on Junubna FM

Chart 4 Allocation of airtime by party on Khartoum State Radio










Chart 5 Allocation of airtime by party on Khartoum State TV

Chart 6 Allocation of airtime by party on Liberty FM












Chart 8 Allocation of airtime by party on Omdurman Radio











Chart 10 Allocation of airtime by party on Radio Bakhita









Chart 11 Allocation of airtime by party on Radio Miraya

Chart 12 Allocation of airtime by party on Rumbek FM









Chart 13 Allocation of airtime by party on Saheroon

Chart 14 Allocation of airtime by party on South Sudan Radio Malakal









Chart 15 Allocation of airtime by party on Spirit FM

Chart 16 Allocation of airtime by party on SSR









Chart 17 Allocation of airtime by party on SSTV

Chart 18 Allocation of airtime by party on Sudan TV









Chart 19 Allocation of time and tone in Al Qwat Al Mussalaha

Chart 20 Allocation of time and tone in Blue Nile









Chart 21 Allocation of time and tone in Junubna FM

Chart 22 Allocation of time and tone in Khartoum State Radio










Chart 23 Allocation of time and tone in Khartoum State TV

Chart 24 Allocation of time and tone in Liberty FM











Chart 26 Allocation of time and tone in North Kurdufan









Chart 27 Allocation of time and tone in Omdurman Radio

Chart 28 Allocation of time and tone in Peace Service










Chart 29 Allocation of time and tone in Radio Bakhita

Chart 30 Allocation of time and tone in Radio Miraya











Chart 32 Allocation of time and tone in Rumbek FM









Chart 33 Allocation of time and tone in Saheroon

Chart 34 Allocation of time and tone in South Sudan Radio Malakal









Chart 35 Allocation of time and tone in Spirit FM

Chart 36 Allocation of time and tone in SSR









Chart 37 Allocation of time and tone in SSTV

Chart 38 Allocation of time and tone in Sudan TV





II. The Post Election Period (15 April – 6 June)

Chart 39 Allocation of airtime by party on Al Qwat Al Mussalaha





Chart 40 Allocation of airtime by party on Blue Nile









Chart 41 Allocation of airtime by party on Junubna FM

Chart 42 Allocation of airtime by party on Khartoum State Radio









Chart 43 Allocation of airtime by party on Khartoum State TV

Chart 44 Allocation of airtime by party on Liberty FM











Chart 46 Allocation of airtime by party on Omdurman Radio








Chart 47 Allocation of airtime by party on Peace Service

Chart 48 Allocation of airtime by party on Radio Bakhita




Chart 49 Allocation of airtime by party on Radio Miraya







Chart 50 Allocation of airtime by party on Red Sea









Chart 52 Allocation of airtime by party on Saheroon









Chart 53 Allocation of airtime by party on South Sudan Radio Malakal

Chart 54 Allocation of airtime by party on Spirit FM









Chart 55 Allocation of airtime by party on SSR

Chart 56 Allocation of airtime by party on SSTV









Chart 57 Allocation of airtime by party on Sudan TV

Chart 58 Allocation of time and tone in Al Qwat Al Mussalaha










Chart 59 Allocation of time and tone in Blue Nile

Chart 60 Allocation of time and tone in Junubna FM











Chart 62 Allocation of time and tone in Khartoum State TV









Chart 63 Allocation of time and tone in Liberty FM

Chart 64 Allocation of time and tone in North Kurdufan









Chart 65 Allocation of time and tone in Omdurman Radio

Chart 66 Allocation of time and tone in Peace Service









Chart 67 Allocation of time and tone in Radio Bakhita

Chart 68 Allocation of time and tone in Radio Miraya









Chart 69 Allocation of time and tone in Red Sea

Chart 70 Allocation of time and tone in Rumbek FM









Chart 71 Allocation of time and tone in Saheroon

Chart 72 Allocation of time and tone in South Sudan Radio Malakal









Chart 73 Allocation of time and tone in Spirit FM

Chart 74 Allocation of time and tone in SSR









Chart 75 Allocation of time and tone in SSTV

Chart 76 Allocation of time and tone in Sudan TV





Annex II – Charts for Print Media

I. The Campaign Period (13 February – 10 April)

Chart 77 Allocation of space and tone in Ajras Al huriah





Chart 78 Allocation of space and tone in Akhbar Alyoum









Chart 79 Allocation of space and tone in Akhir Lahza

Chart 80 Allocation of space and tone in Al Ayam









Chart 81 Allocation of space and tone in Al Intibaha

Chart 82 Allocation of space and tone in Al Ray Al Aam









Chart 83 Allocation of space and tone in Al Sahfa

Chart 84 Allocation of space and tone in Al Sudani









Chart 85 Allocation of space and tone in Juba Post

Chart 86 Allocation of space and tone in Khartoum Monitor









Chart 87 Allocation of space and tone in Southern Eye

Chart 88 Allocation of space and tone in Sudan Vision








Chart 89 Allocation of space and tone in The Citizen



II. The Post Election Period (15 April – 6 June)

Chart 90 Allocation of space and tone in Ajras Al huriah





Chart 91 Allocation of space and tone in Akhbar Alyoum









Chart 92 Allocation of space and tone in Akhir Lahza

Chart 93 Allocation of space and tone in Al Ayam









Chart 94 Allocation of space and tone in Al Intibaha

Chart 95 Allocation of space and tone in Al Ray Al Aam









Chart 96 Allocation of space and tone in Al Sahfa

Chart 97 Allocation of space and tone in Al Sudani









Chart 98 Allocation of space and tone in Juba Post

Chart 99 Allocation of space and tone in Khartoum Monitor









Chart 100 Allocation of space and tone in Southern Eye

Chart 101 Allocation of space and tone in Sudan Vision









Chart 102 Allocation of space and tone in The Citizen



Annex III – Charts for Hate Speech and Inflammatory Language

I. The Campaign Period (13 February – 10 April)

Chart 103 Types of Speech






Chart 104 Types of sources



Chart 105 Types of targets





Chart 10614 Geographical areas





II. The Post Election Period (15 April – 6 June)




Chart 10715 Types of Speech

Chart 108 Types of sources






Chart 109 Types of targets





Chart 110 Geographical areas








Chart 111 Comparison between the campaign and the post election period



List of abbreviations for political parties

Party	Name
AA	Ansar Alsona
ADP	Awareness Democratic Party
ANCP	African National Congress Party
BCP	Beja Congress Party
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party - Al Digair
DUPO	Democratic Unionist Party - Ar Digan Democratic Unionist Party - Original
DUID	Democratic United Salvation Party
EDP	Eastern Democratic Party
EDF	-
FotS	Eastern Party - Justice and Development Front of the South
FWP	Free Will Party
	•
HDP	Hagiga Democratic Party
ILP	Islamic Liberation Party
IMP	Islamic Moderate Party
JAP	Juba Alliance Party
JNA	Juba National Alliance
LDP	Liberal Democrats Party
MBO	Muslim Brothers Organisation
MP	Movement Party
MSOP	Modern Sudan Organisation Party
MSUP	Maoyst Socialist Unionist Party
NASP	Nassiri Arab Socialists Party
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDFP	National Democratic Front Party
NDP	National Democratic Party
NDUF	National Democratic United Front
NFDM	New Forces Democratic Movement
NIF	National Islamic Front
NJP	National Justice Party
NLP	National Liberation Party
NNDP	New National Democratic Party
NPAP	National People's Alliance Party
NPP	National Popular Party
NRenP	National Renaissance Party
NRP	National Reform Party
NSP	New Sudan Party
NUDP	Nassiri Unionist Democratic Party
NUP	National Unionist Party
Other	Other
PCongP	People's Congress Party
PCP	Popular Congress Party
PFDR	Peoples' Forces and Democratic Rights
PSJP	Progress and Social Justice Party
RCP	Revolutionist Committees Party
SA	Sudan Ana
SANP	Sudan African National Party
	<i>,</i>



SANU	Sudan African National Union
SAP	Sudan Alliance Party
SBP	Sudanese Baath Party
SConP	Sudanese Congress Party
SCP	Sudanese Communist Party
SDCMP	Sudanese Democratic Change Movement Party
SDPCES	Social Democratic Party Congress Eastern Sudan
SFLP	Sudanese Free Lions Party
SFNP	Sudanese Free National Party
SLFOP	Sudan Labour Forces Organisation Party
SNFGUP	South and North Funj General Union Party
SNFO	Sudanese National Front Organisation
SNLP	Sudanese National Labour Party
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-DC	DC - Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSDF	South Sudan Democratic Forum
SSDP	Sudanese Socialist Democratic Party
SSoliDP	Sudanese Solidarity Democratic Party
SSUDF	South Sudan United Democratic Front
SUDPC	Sudanese United Democratic Party Congress
SUFP	Sudanese United Forces Party
SUNP	Sudanese United National Party
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDP	United Democratic Party
UDSPF	Union of Democratic Socialist Party Fatma
UDUP	United Democratic Unionist Party
UFP	Umma Federal Party
UNP	Umma National Party
UP-C	Umma Party - Collective
UPopF	United Popular Front
UPRD	Umma Party - Reform and Development
URRP	Umma Renewal and Reform Party
USAP	Union of the Sudanese African Parties
USDF	United Salvation Democratic Front
USNP	United Sudan National Party
USSP	United South Sudan Party
WANUP	Wadi Al-Neel Unionist Party
WBP	White Brigade Party





