The Copenhagen Manual: Recognising and responding to information operations
The manual adds to the growing literature on how to fortify democratic institutions and independent media actors in protecting against malign influences and mis- and disinformation.
It has become increasingly clear that foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is more than a mere clash between the traditional notions of “true” and “false”: it is a tactical, well-planned effort to shape the way reality is perceived and, consequently, acted upon – weaponising trust and transparency in order to weaken the credibility of democratic processes.
The Copenhagen Manual: Recognising and responding to information operations sustains a vulnerability-centred approach which prescribes a proactive and early-warning oriented strategy through signal identification, careful assessments, cross-border coordination between actors and support to media literacy.
FIMI is a structural and evolving threat rather than a conventional security issue. Internal and external hostile actors exploit vulnerabilities within the information ecosystems of open democracies, eroding their foundations from within. Media organisations must go beyond reporting events: they should actively help shape an information environment that safeguards clarity, stability and trust. As the Copenhagen Manual underscores, systematic measures are essential to strengthening media resilience. Independent media, civil society and judicial systems together form a network of checks and balances whose resilience reinforces that of the democratic system as a whole. Media organisations are therefore not merely observers, but active participants in preserving its integrity.
FIMI acts at the intersection between information flows, financial incentives, public expectations and the general legitimacy of political structures, exploiting pre-existing weaknesses found in institutions and media actors. Cases like Storm-1516 – a Russian propagandist group – exemplify the way artificial intelligence, social media and fabricated videos can influence electoral processes. The group crafted discrediting narratives aimed at US presidential candidate Kamala Harris in 2024 and Hungarian candidate (now prime minister) Peter Magyar during last spring’s elections. Another target has been American support to Ukraine, through the creation of false media focused on the supposed misallocation of aid by Ukrainian military and civil officials – portrayed as corrupt, anti-American and anti-democratic.
At the core of FIMI lies a narrative-construction technique that aims to fuel historical grievances, emotional resonance and unproportional interpretative frameworks, subverting the ordinary procedures of journalism. Due to these factors, prebunking – a tool to anticipate false narratives and shape audience expectations in advance – is crucial, requiring actors to master an adequate use of editorial intent, publication timing and news amplification in their coordinated responses. Transparent collaboration between media actors and institutions matters just as much as factual accuracy, paving the way for calibrated responses based on balanced reporting, maintaining audience trust and building resistance.
The Copenhagen Information Integrity Charette
On 23-24 March 2026, IMS convened media professionals and experts from Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, the Western Balkans, Scandinavia and the United Kingdom at the Copenhagen Information Integrity Charette, dedicated to the urgent and primary task of countering FIMI.
Written by Rufin Zamfir, FIMI expert, the Copenhagen Manual is the final product of two intensive days, abundant with discussions, insights and practical work, including a Table Top Exercise. The manual adds to the growing literature on how to fortify democratic institutions and independent media actors in protecting against malign influences and mis- and disinformation.
Built on the collaborative spirit of the Copenhagen Conference on Information Integrity, hosted by IMS in autumn 2025, the Charette was a vital spacewhere independent media, investigative journalists, representatives of public institutions and information security experts helped shape acommon understanding on FIMI, as a solid basis for the future development of dedicated guidelines and comprehensive recommendations.
Manual summary by Nicholas Contini.



