The Media and Complex Humanitarian Emergencies
There is little doubt that the media can have a profound effect on complex emergencies. The best known examples are the notorious use of hate radio in Rwanda and Bosnia to encourage ethnic cleansing. Less well known is the potential for the media to do the opposite - that is, to support the efforts of the humanitarian aid agencies in complex emergencies, even to the extent of helping with peace-building. International agencies are increasingly interested in the notion that, if handled appropriately, the mass media could make a positive impact on complex emergencies as it has with health education worldwide. This article will analyse some of these experiences and draw some tentative conclusions for future guidance.
Background
Today, more people are liable to experience conflict than at any time in the
past: during this century, an estimated 110 million have died, and at present
there are about 20 million refugees and 50 million displaced people in the world.
Many are excluded from the global revolution in communications. Half the world's
population has never made a phone call , and the growth of FM radio stations
is concentrated in population centres. People in more remote areas have to make
do with increasingly badly funded state broadcasters, victims of structural
adjustment and other financial constraints.
These are the people who are most likely to suffer from hunger, from health problems and lack of schooling. Often they are areas of complex emergency, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi and southern Sudan.
These are also the people that aid organisations and donors such as the British Department for International Development are increasingly targeting with their poverty focus programmes. But generally they are the most difficult to reach, because of distance, poor roads and other links, or because of security concerns.They do often possess, however, a vital piece of equipment which could be their lifeline - a radio.
Radios are cheap and portable, and they don't require mains electricity, so they tend to survive in conflict zones when other mass media such as newspapers and televisions fail. BBC audience research shows that in Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia, for instance, listenership to the BBC World Service is high. Conflicts in fact generate listeners, as the Gulf War showed. The most recent statistic comes from a large scale United Nations survey in Afghanistan, which showed that no fewer than 50% of the population regularly listen to the BBC Pashto and Persian language services. This is in a country which has been in a state of war for 20 years and which has one of the smallest per capita incomes in the world.
Theoretical
Framework
There is accumulating evidence that well targeted media interventions can make
a positive contribution to the livelihoods of listeners living in complex emergency
areas. Robert Manoff from New York University's Center for War, Peace and News
Media broadly sees a potential peace-building role for news broadcasters in
conflict areas in the following terms. Journalism, he writes, can:
This model emphasises the media's role in enabling communication as opposed to simply providing information. Communication has been defined as 'a process by which we make sense out of events … information has meaning to the individual only to the extent that it can be interpreted, understood, and applied to that individual according to his or her own circumstances'. Information does not necessarily lead to improved knowledge. Much information in the media is slanted, partial, not relevant or just plain wrong. But in sensitive hands, the media can be used to promote genuine communication, which can help lead to social change.
The implications of this approach is that the strictly impartial journalistic approach of reporting facts gives way to producing programmes with a very definite editorial objective, whether it is to reduce diarrhoea in children through promoting better hygiene, reducing land mines casualties, or promoting peace building solutions to conflict. This approach has been termed 'desired outcomes' broadcasting.
Ongoing work by several organisations in The Communications Initiative is attempting to define the criteria which are most likely to lead to effective 'desired outcomes' media interventions in the field of health communications. These include:
The BBC
Afghan Education Drama New Home New Life
One example of how the media has been used successfully in this way is the BBC
Afghan radio soap opera New Home New Life which started life in 1993.
The story was of two communities surviving during a time of war, with a wide
range of relevant storylines from child health to drug addiction to local conflict
resolution. Its success with listeners was immediate, and there was encouraging
evidence that men and women were learning and remembering significant health
and other information which they found valuable in their everyday lives. In
one survey from 1997 there is compelling evidence that New Home New Life
has an impact not just on people's understanding, but on behaviour also. This
is reflected in the statistics of those who were killed and injured in landmines
incidents: according to the survey, listeners of New Home New Life and
other BBC programmes on mines awareness were only half as likely to be involved
in mine explosions than non-listeners. The survey sample was large - a total
of 60,000 people were interviewed altogether - which increases confidence in
the validity of the findings.
So what is it about New Home New Life which has led to this impact? There are a number of factors: first that the BBC in Afghanistan is widely listened to and trusted, and that there are few other credible information sources. Secondly, the programmes are entertaining and they contain useful and relevant information - the stories are created by talented Afghan writers situated in the region, and are vetted by Afghan and expatriate staff members of aid organisations to make sure they are technically accurate and relevant. Thirdly, listeners' views are routinely canvassed and their ideas for future storylines are regularly presented to the scriptwriters and the production team. Fourthly, Afghans have a strong oral/aural culture to which radio broadcasting is well sited. Storytelling is popular, and people have excellent memories for what they hear.
In addition, anthropological research on New Home New Life has shown that the programme does stimulate discussion, particularly on issues which are thought to effect the family. An extreme example of this was when one of the most popular characters in the soap was killed in the course of a feud. There was an outcry from the listeners, with one group of tribesmen even going so far as holding a prayer service in the mosque for the character's departed soul!
This is a significant indicator of the extent to which the audience has assumed 'ownership' of New Home New Life and of the educational material it conveys. Information 'ownership' is a key criteria identified by The Communications Initiative for effective programming. Partnerships have formed the basis to one of the project's other successes, the joint mobilisation with UNICEF, the World Health Organisation and a number of NGOs of the three mass immunisation weeks. Radio, particularly the BBC, played a key role in explaining the need for immunisation and in appealing for a ceasefire. On all three occasions, the ceasefires were almost 100% respected - the only such occasions in almost 20 years of war.
Bosnia:
media reform in an ethnically divided society
In Bosnia, the media has been seen as a key player in the post-war reconstruction
process, but it has been used in a very different way. The international community
is the effective power in the land, under powers accorded to the Office of the
High Representative (OHR). The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) charged with holding free elections in Bosnia also decided to
sponsor the formation of an independent radio network (FERN), while the OHR
established an independent TV service called the Open Broadcasting Network (OBN),
both of which were intended to appeal to the three until recently warring communities,
the Muslims, Croats and Serbs. The aid organisations - the UN, the EU and the
bi-lateral funders also funded a number of local radio and TV stations.
The overall objective was to establish an editorially diverse, pluralistic media. But the initial lack of emphasis on programming and journalistic skills meant that programming on the smaller local stations was generally poor. They were no challenge to the big state broadcasters, whose programming continued to be partisan and at times (in the case of Republica Serpska TV SRT) poisonous propaganda. Ultimately, NATO troops had to take over SRT transmitters, and forced the broadcast of the OBN news programme each evening for one hour.
What are the lessons to be learned from this experience? The first is that it was a serious omission not to spell out the responsibilities and powers of the international community over the local media in the Dayton Peace Accords, particularly when it was well known that the media has played such a negative role in the war. This was not clarified until two years later, at a NATO summit in May 1997. Secondly, it is invariably a mistake to throw money at broadcasters in complex emergencies and walk away, expecting standards to improve. Follow up advice, training and brainstorming on programme ideas is required.
The third lesson is the preoccupation of the international community on news programming. Straight, accurate reporting will take many years to achieve in Bosnia. An alternative approach, to use drama and other entertaining programming to convey pro-social messages, has not been part of the media strategy. There was one attempt to produce a home grown topical TV soap in the Bosnian Muslim enclave of Gorazde: despite its amateurism it became essential viewing in the valley before it stopped after a year in 1997.
The fourth lesson to be drawn from the Bosnia experience that many errors could have been avoided had the information strategists started by finding our what the media consumers wanted to listen to and watch, and what their aspirations and most pressing problems were in the post war period. Yet it took two years to for the first social research of this kind to be commissioned, with USAID and the World Bank in the lead. The results of this research indicate a preference for entertainment - something they lack in difficult task of rebuilding their lives after the war. One fundamental principle of effective media targeting - know your audience - has been learned late in the Bosnian experience.
Conclusions
Information is power, and communications is the process of providing this power
of knowledge to people so they can make informed decisions about improving their
lives. If the media are to be used to this end in complex emergencies, it is
clear that careful planning and a deep understanding of the target population
are essential. For ideas to take root and to become the basis for changed attitudes
and behaviour, there is a real need to establish a two way communication process
with the target audience, so they feel part of the process. In addition, building
partnerships of trust between the media and aid organisations on the ground
is at the heart of any media strategy in a complex emergency - the problems
are so diverse that overcoming them requires a wide variety of understanding
and expertise. It is also important to set realistic objectives when it comes
to 'desired outcomes' programming: 'do the do-ables', unlike in Bosnia where
the international community wanted to put across ideas such the safe return
of refugees and the extradition of war criminals which were simply not supported
by most of the population.. On the other hand, Afghanistan is a case of a complex
emergency where the creative use of the mass media has delivered results where
conventional aid efforts have failed. Fewer people are being injured by mines,
not as a result of training courses, but through listening to a radio soap opera.
The problems of delivering 'bulk aid' to a country at war, with poor communications and a widely dispersed population, are enormous. What is needed is a greater emphasis on 'smart aid', the effective dissemination of information to allow people to help themselves. The role of the communicator is to create the optimal conditions for consumers of information to become knowledgeable and to put their newly found knowledge into action. This means a close understanding of the target audience and the issues which are of concern to them, as well as programming flair - the knack of stimulating audiences through radio, video or print. Major donors are slowly recognising the importance of supporting communications initiatives in the field of development, conflict and humanitarian aid. The potential is enormous, but funding remains the major constraint. After all, if this approach can work in Afghanistan, it is surely worth giving 'smart aid' a higher priority in complex emergencies elsewhere.